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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Harrison Gamino appeals from the district court's Order Re: Conditional
Admission to Probation Violation.

Mr. Gamino admitted to violating probation but

preserved the right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss the violation. He
asserts that, because the petition to revoke his probation was filed after his period of
probation had expired, the district court lacked jurisdiction to extend his probation.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
On February 18, 2004, Mr. Gamino was charged with two counts of burglary and
one count of grand theft.

(R., p.31.) Mr. Gamino pleaded guilty to one count of

burglary, and on May 10, 2004, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven
years, with five years fixed, and the court suspended the sentence and placed
Mr. Gamino on probation for a period of four years.

(R., p.49-50.)

His period of

probation, therefore, was set to expire on May 10, 2008.
On July 21, 2005, the State filed a Petition To Revoke Probation, asserting
several probation violations. On November 7, 2005, the district court entered an Order
On Motion To Revoke Probation. (R., p.138.)

Rather than revoking probation, the

district court ordered, "that the defendant's sentence will be further suspended and
probation is continued under the same terms and conditions as previously imposed,"
with several additional terms of probation. (R., p.140.)
On May 16, 2008, six days after the four-year period of probation expired, the
State filed another Petition To Revoke Probation. (R., p.156.) The Report of Probation

violation, which was attached to the petition, is dated May 8, 2008. (R., p.182.) The
report of violation alleges that Mr. Gamino still owed $4,591.00 and had failed to follow
through with the payment plan ordered by the district court. (R., p.182.) It further
alleged that he owed $300.00 in supervision fees. (R., p.183.)
Mr. Gamino filed a Motion To Dismiss Probation Violation, asserting that his
probation expired on May 10, 2008, and because the State's petition was not filed in the
district court until May 16, 2008, the court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation.
(R., p.190.) The district court denied the motion. (R., p.193.) Mr. Gamino then entered
into a Conditional Admission To Probation Violation, wherein he admitted to the
violation but reserved his right to appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss.

(R., p.395.) The district court entered an order on the conditional admission, extending
Mr. Gamino's probation for another period of two years, but providing that probation
would be terminated upon payment of restitution and fees.

(R., pp.199-200.)

Mr. Gamino appealed. (R., p.201.) He asserts that the district court erred by denying
his motion to dismiss because his probation had expired by the time the State filed its
petition to revoke probation.

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Gamino's motion to dismiss where probation
had expired by the time the State filed its petition to revoke probation?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred Bv Denyina Mr. Gamino's Motion To Dismiss Because
Mr. Gamino's Probation Had Expired Bv The Time The State Filed Its Petition To
Revoke Probation
A.

Introduction
Mr. Gamino asserts that, because his probation expired on May 10, 2008, and

the petition to revoke his probation was not filed until May 16, 2008, the district court
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the State's petition and erred by denying the motion to
dismiss on this basis
B.

The District Court Erred Bv Denying Mr. Gamino's Motion To Dismiss Because
Mr. Gamino's Probation Had Expired When The State Filed Its Petition To
Revoke Probation
The facts of this case are simple and undisputed. By the terms of his probation

I
1

agreement, Mr. Gamino's period of probation expired on May 10, 2008. Six days after
Mr. Gamino's probation expired, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation

I

because Mr. Gamino had not paid restitution or fees. Mr. Gamino asserts that, because
the State's petition was not filed before May 10, 2008, the district court lacked
jurisdiction to act on the State's petition and the district court therefore, erred in denying
his motion to dismiss on this basis.
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of
statutes. State v. Harvey, 142 ldaho 727, 730, 132 P.3d 1255, 1258 (Ct. App. 2006)
I

i

(citing State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003)).
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect

I

to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. Id. (citing State v.
Rhode, 133 ldaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 ldaho

654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 ldaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65,
67 (Ct. App. 2000)). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and
rational meaning.

Id. (citing Burnight, 132 ldaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219.) If the

language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to
legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Id. (citing Escobar, 134 ldaho at
389, 3 P.3d at 67). When this Court engages in statutory construction, it has the duty to
ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Id. (citing Rhode, 133 ldaho
at 462, 988 P.2d at 688). To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the
literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public
policy behind the statute, and the legislative history. Id. It is incumbent upon the Court
to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. Id. (citing State v.
Beard, 135 ldaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001)). A construction of a
statute that would lead to an absurd result is disfavored. Id. (citing State v. Doe, 140
ldaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 525 (2004); State v. Yager, 139 ldaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d

ldaho Code § 20-222 states:
The period of probation or suspension of sentence may be indeterminate
or may be fixed by the court, and may at any time be extended or
terminated by the court. Such period with any extension thereof shall not
exceed the maximum period for which the defendant might have been
imprisoned.
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court may
issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or
suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested.
Thereupon the court, after summary hearing may revoke the probation
and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be
executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought before it and may
continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction.

I.C.

3 20-222 (emphasis added). Therefore, at any time during probation, the district

court may issue a warrant for violation of any of the conditions of probation and cause
the defendant to be arrested. I.C. § 20-222. Thereupon, the court may revoke or
continue probation. I.C. 3 20-222. However, I.C. 3 19-2602 states:
If it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the terms and conditions
upon which the defendant was placed on probation by the court or any of
them have been violated or for any other cause satisfactory to the court,
the court may, at any time within the longest period for which the
defendant might have been originally sentenced by judgment of the court,
issue a bench warrant for the rearrest of the defendant.
I.C.

5

19-2602 (emphasis added). This statute seems to suggest that, so long as

probation revocation proceedings are commenced within the time period for which a
defendant might have been sentenced, the revocation is timely. However, this directly
conflicts with the language of I.C. § 20-222, which requires that revocation proceedings
occur "during probation." I.C. § 20-222.
To the extent that these statutes conflict, I.C. § 20-222 applies. The rule of lenity
requires that courts construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the accused.
State v. Shanks, 139 ldaho 152, 156, 75 P.3d 206, 210 (Ct. App. 2003). Further, if
I.C. 9 19-2602 were to control, the language or section 20-222

would be rendered

meaningless. Finally, the Court of Appeals has clearly stated, "we . . . hold that so long
as probation revocation proceedings are commenced during the period of probafion, the
court acts within its authority set forth in I.C. § 20-222 to revoke or continue probation."
Harvey, 142 ldaho at 731,132 P.3d at 1259.
However, in this case, the district court held that I.C. 5j 19-2602 applied. (8111/08
Tr., (3.17, Ls. 15-23.) Specifically, the court stated:

In this case, I'm going to - my determination is going to be that the
allegation is that the probation was not complied with during - the
allegation arose during the four-year term in which the defendant was on
probation and that the motion by the prosecutor is timely under 19-2602.
It was at least signed before the probation terminated. It was not filed
before the probation period set by the Court was terminated, but it was
fielding during the 10-year period under 19-2602.
(8/11/08 Tr., p.17, Ls. 15-23.) The district court erred by applying I.C. 5 19-2602 rather
than I.C.

5 20-222.

The rule of lenity requires any conflict between these statutes be

interpreted in favor of Mr. Gamino and applying I.C. § 19-2602 renders I.C.

5

20-222

meaningless. Probation revocation proceedings must be commenced during the period
of probation and in this case they were not.
Further, the fact that the report of probation violation was created on May 8,
2008, and signed by the Department of Probation and Parole on May, 9, 2008, is
irrelevant. (R., pp.182-183.) Probation revocation proceedings must be "commenced
during the period of probation." Harvey, 142 Idaho at 731, 132 P.3d at 1259 (emphasis
added). The fact that the report was signed before the period of probation expired does
not mean that revocation proceedings were "commenced." The petition to revoke
probation was filed on May 16, 2008, and this is the date that controls. (R., p.156.) The
fact that the report was created and signed by a member of Department of Probation
and Parole signifies only that the claims were being investigated by the Department;
nothing was commenced in district court until May 16.

(See R., p.3 (Register of

Actions).)
Criminal cases are commenced by the actual filing of an information or an
indictment. See State v. Jones, 140 ldaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). They
are not commenced by the prosecutor deciding to file a charging document. Likewise,

revocation proceedings are not commenced simply because the Department decides to
issue a report of probation violation. They are commenced when an actual petition is
filed in district court.
Finally, May 10, 2008, was the actual date that the period of probation expired
and there is no argument that Mr. Gamino's period of probation had been tolled. In
Harvey, the Court of Appeals discussed whether periods of probation can be tolled
under I.C. $20-222. In Harvey, the defendant was sentenced to a determinate term of
twenty years for lewd conduct with a minor. Harvey, 142 Idaho at 728, 132 P.3d at
1256. Following a period of retained jurisdiction, the court suspended the sentence and
placed Harvey on probation for a period of seven years. Id., 142 ldaho at 729, 132 P.3d
at 1257.
in 1989, the State filed a petition to revoke probation due to the fact that
Mr. Harvey had remained away from his residence and had failed to inform his
probation officer that he intended to change his residence. Id. Mr. Harvey was arrested
on the violation in December, 1989. Id. Mr. Harvey admitted to the violations and on
March 9, 1990, the district court continued his probation and ordered that he serve
ninety days in jail.

Id. On March 22, the State filed another petition for probation

violation, asserting that Mr. Harvey had escaped from jail. Id. On March 23, the district
court issued a warrant, which was served on October 9, 1991, in another state. Id. On
December 6, the district court again continued Mr. Harvey's probation. Id.
On March 24, 1992, the State filed yet another petition for probation violation
which was not served on Mr. Harvey until April 15, 1997 in another state. Id. On

June 17, 1997, the court revoked Mr. Harvey's probation and executed his sentence.

In 2002, Mr. Harvey filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting that
the maximum period of time he could have been placed on probation was five years,
and therefore his probation expired in 1991. Id. Alternatively, he asserted that because
his probationary period was seven years, and it had never been extended by the court,
his probation expired in 1993. Id.
The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that Mr. Harvey's period of probation
had been tolled. The court stated, "[tlo determine that the tolling rule did not apply in
this case and that the district court's jurisdiction over Harvey had expired would lead to
a patently absurd result and nullify legislative intent that probation rehabilitate the
defendant while protecting society." Id., 142 ldaho at 731, 132 P.3d at 1259. The court
stated:
[w]e therefore conclude that the ldaho legislature could not have intended
for a probationer to have the ability to avoid the conditions of probation
entirely by absconding from supervision until the probationary period
expired. Thus, we hold that a probationary period is tolled form the date
probation revocation proceedings are commenced until probation is
continued or revoked.
Id.

Mr. Gamino acknowledges that prior probation revocation proceedings were

commenced against him in this case. On July 21, 2005, the State filed a Petition To
Revoke Probation, asserting several probation violations. On November 7, 2005, the
district court entered an Order On Motion To Revoke Probation. (R., p.138.) Rather
than revoking probation, the district court ordered, "that the defendant's sentence will be
further suspended and probation is continued under the same terms and conditions as

previously imposed," with several additional terms of probation. (R., p.140.) However,
there are several reasons that his probation period should not be tolled.
First, the district court, when it continued probation, did not extend the
probationary period. (R., p.140.) Second, the district court in this case specifically held
that tolling did not apply because Mr. Gamino had not absconded from probation and
that the period of probation expired on May 10, 2008. (8/11108 Tr., p.14, Ls.18-24.)
The court asked the prosecutor, ''just removing issues here, there's no argument that
the defendant absconded and the probation period is extended because he absconded;
am I correct here?" (8/11/08 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-5.) The prosecutor responded, "[tlhat is
correct." (8/11/08 Tr., p.14, L.6.) Finally, there is no policy reason for extending the
period of probation in this case. There is no dispute that Mr. Gamino did not abscond
and that he was being supervised. The Department of Probation and Parole had every
opportunity to file the probation violation and have a warrant served on Mr. Gamino
within the probationary period. It simply failed to do so. Therefore, as the district court
found, Mr. Gamino's probation expired on May 10, 2008. Because the State failed to
file its petition to revoke probation by that date, the district court erred by denying
Mr. Gamino's motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Gamino requests that the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss
be reversed and his case remanded for further proceedings.
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